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Abstract:  A novel technique for the generation of complex and lengthy code sequences using low- 
length linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) for data scrambling and descrambling is proposed. The 
scheme has been implemented using VHSIC hardware description language (VHDL) approach which 
allows the reconfigurability of the proposed system such that the length of the generated sequences 
can  be  changed  as  per  the  security  requirements.  In  the  present  design  consideration  the  power 
consumption  and  chip  area  requirements  are  small  and  the  operating  speed  is  high  compared  to 
conventional discrete I.C. design, which is a pre-requisite for any system designer.  The design has 
been synthesised on device EP2S15F484C3 of Straitx II FPGA family, using Quarts Altera version 
8.1.  The simulation results have been found satisfactory and are in conformity with the theoretical 
observations. 
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Introduction 
 
Since the birth of the cellular industry, security has been a major concern for both service 
providers  and  subscribers.  Service  providers  are  primarily  concerned  with  preventing  fraudulent 
operations such as cloning or subscription fraud while subscribers are mainly concerned with privacy 
issues. With the advent of second-generation digital technology platforms like TDMA/CDMA-IS-41,   
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operators were able to enhance their network security by using improved encryption algorithms and 
other means. The noise-like signature of a CDMA signal over the air interface makes eavesdropping 
very difficult. This is due to the CDMA “long code,” a pseudo-random noise (PN) sequence of long 
length, which is used to scramble voice and data transmissions. The PN sequence is represented as a 
sequence of 1's and 0's with certain properties and the sequences are generally categorised into two 
classes: (1) periodic sequences and (2) aperiodic sequences. The class of sequences used in spread-
spectrum  communication  is  usually  periodic.  There  are  many  types  of  periodic  sequences,  some 
popular  ones  being  (i)  maximal-length  linear  shift  register  sequences  (m-sequences), (ii) quadratic 
residue  sequences  (q-r  sequences),  (iii)  Hall  sequences,  and  (iv)  twin  primes.    Among  all  these 
sequences, the most commonly used ones are m-sequences. 
   The PN key generation is of paramount importance for any secure communication system.  
Maximal sequences are easily generated by linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs). A LFSR [1-2] 
consists of a shift register and a feedback network (or a parity generator) consisting of only modulo-2 
adders (XOR gates). The output of the feedback network is applied to the input of the shift register. 
The  feedback  network  provides  output  logic  0  when  an  even  number  of  input is  at  logic  1  and 
generates logic 1 when an odd number of input is at logic 1 state. Maximal-sequence codes generated 
by using LFSRs are not adequately secure when smaller lengths of LFSRs are employed. 
  Many circuits using LFSR for generation of complex codes have been reported in the literature 
[3-5].  Feedback-with-carry shift registers (FCSRs) and schemes using various combinations of LFSRs 
have been proposed for complex key generation but seem to be expensive for commercial application 
[6]. The security of the encrypted data is a direct function of the number of stages of shift register 
used to generate the key. This means, to increase data security, the number of stages of the shift 
register is to be increased, which leads to an increase in the complexity of the system in terms of 
power, space and cost [7].  
  In  this  paper  a  relatively  low-length  shift  register  for  the  generation  of  highly  secure  m-
sequence generator is presented, wherein the feedback tappings keep on changing in a pseudo-random 
manner, which makes the generated codes quite complex. The complex code generated is used to 
scramble incoming plain text.  At the receiving end, the  same code is generated and successfully used 
to  decrypt  the  transmitted  data.  The  simplicity  of  the  circuit  along  with  the  complexity  of  the 
generated  codes  makes  the  circuit  attractive  for  secure  message  communication  applications. The 
proposed technique of complex code generation is modelled in VHSIC hardware description language 
(VHDL), synthesised and simulated for a field programmable gate array (FPGA) target device. This 
approach allows the reconfigurability [8-10] of the proposed system such that the key complexity can 
be further enhanced as per the security requirements. Further, this type of implementation offers many 
advantages over conventional IC design vis-à-vis dynamic power consumption, space occupied and 
stray capacitances [11].  
 
Description of Proposed Complex-Code-Based Data Scrambler and Descrambler 
The  proposed  scheme  is  shown  in  Figure  1.  The  heart  of  the  system  is  a  complex  code 
generator, as shown in Figure 2, which generates a long and highly complex key stream. The various   
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available PN codes at the output of the complex code generator (Q1 to Qn) are applied as input to the 
AND gates of the scrambler that act as tap gains. The tap gain outputs are applied to the logical 
function  that  produces  a  complex  key  to  scramble  the  plain  text.  The  complex  key  generated  is 
XORed with the plain text to produce cipher text, also known as cryptogram. At the receiving end the 
same key is generated and used to decrypt the incoming cipher text. The whole system has been 
modelled  using  VHDL  and  hence  one  can  exploit  the  reconfigurability  feature  of  Description 
Languages  to  enhance  the  system  security  and  optimise  the  power  consumption  and  speed  of 
operation. The complex code generator used to scramble the incoming plain text uses an 8-bit LFSR 
which can generate 16 different sets of 255-bit code sequences, depending upon 16 valid sets  of 
feedback  tappings,  viz.  {8,4,3,2},  {8,6,5,4},  {8,6,5,3},  {8,5,3,2},  {8,6,5,2},  {8,6,3,2},  {8,5,3,1}, 
{8,7,4,3},  {8,6,5,1},  {8,7,3,2},  {8,7,6,1},  {8,7,2,1},  {8,7,6,5,2,1}, {8,7,6,3,2,1}, {8,6,4,3,2,1} or 
{8,7,6,5,3,2}. Any one of these sets of feedback tappings can be used at a time so that a particular 
combination of the output of the LFSR is connected back to its input through a modulo-2 adder. Thus, 
any  one  of  the  above  sets  of  feedback  connections  can  be  selected  at  a  time  to  generate  the 
corresponding code-sequence, in part or in full, depending on the time for which the selected feedback 
remains connected.  If these feedback connections are changed synchronously in a random manner, the 
output sequence (Q’s in Figure 2) also changes correspondingly. For simplicity of demonstration of 
the scheme, only seven sets of feedback connections, viz. {8,4,3,2}, {8,6,5,4}, {8,6,5,3}, {8,5,3,2}, 
{8,6,5,2}, {8,6,3,2} and {8,6,5,1}, are chosen here. These sets of feed-back connections are obtained 
by XORing various output streams of the LFSR.  One set of these connections can be selected at a 
time  with  the  help  of  an  8-to-1  line multiplexer (MUX) controlled by a 3-bit word generated by 
another PN sequence as shown in Figure 2.  Since ‘000’ state is to be avoided as the control word of 
the MUX (because the PN sequence generates the required control word), only seven input signals of 
the MUX (one at a time) will be chosen depending upon the control word.  Thus, feedback tappings 
are changed randomly, selecting one at a time out of the set of seven different sets. Hence, depending 
upon the value of N (the divide-by factor in the circuit), together with the initial state of the code 
generator and the initial state of the MUX, a complex code sequence is generated. The complex codes 
generated (Q1 to Q8) are used as input to AND gates to generate the tap gains. These tap gains are 
given to the logic function generator which manipulates the data and produces the complex key, the 
key  being  modulo-2-added  with  plain  text and thus resulting in a cryptogram. The cryptogram is 
applied to the shifting logic so as to increase the complexity of the key and hence the security of data. 
At the receiving end, the same key is generated and used for the successful decryption of received 
data. 
 
Simulation Results and Verification 
The proposed scheme has been modelled in VHDL, synthesised and simulated for target device 
EP2S15F484C3 of Straitx II FPGA family using Quarts Altera version 8.1.  It is important to mention 
that Stratix II devices can be used for implementing memory functions and complex logic functions 
such  as  digital  signal  processing,  wide  data-path  manipulation,  data  transformation,  and   
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microcontrollers. The high-pin-count Stratix II devices contain a two-dimensional row- and column-
based architecture to implement custom logic.  The devices provide adaptive look-up tables (ALUTs), 
memory bits, and adaptive logic modules (ALMs). They also include input and output low-voltage 
differential  signalling  (LVDS)  channels  and  provide  dedicated  circuitry  to  support differential  I/O 
standards at up to 1 Gbps when using dynamic phase alignment (DPA) and 840 Mbps when not using 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Complex-code-generator-based data scrambler and descrambler 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.   Complex code generator 
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DPA. Stratix II devices provide enhanced phase-locked loops (PLLs), fast PLLs, and regional clock 
networks to increase performance, and also provide advanced clock interfacing and clock-frequency 
synthesis. The devices also contain 16 dedicated clock pins for controlling signals with large fan-outs. 
In addition, all Stratix II devices include enhanced and fast (PLL) circuitry. 
  The wave forms obtained at various check nodes (output terminals at which output codes are 
available) of the complex code generator corresponding to all the 255 × 7 sequence combinations have 
been investigated and found in conformity with the theoretical observations.  As shown in Figure 3, 
‘Clk’ is an input signal which drives the PN sequence generator. PN (7) to PN (0) are the resultant 
output PN sequences. For seed value (initial value with which LFSR is loaded) of ‘11111111’ and 
feedback tapping (8, 4, 3, 2), theoretically, the LFSR output sequence (with PN(7) as MSB and PN(0) 
as LSB) passes through the following states with subsequent clock cycles: ‘01111111’, ‘00111111’, 
‘10011111’,  ‘01001111’,  ‘00100111’,  ‘000100111’,  ‘000010011’,  ‘10000100’,  and  so  on.  (The 
pattern generated is a function of feedback tapping. Hence, the next pattern depends on the previous 
one  and  the  feedback  tapping.)    The  wave  form  obtained  for  LFSR  seed  value  ‘11111111’  and 
selected tap position (8, 4, 3, 2) for a few clock cycles is presented in Figure 3, which confirms that 
the results obtained are in agreement with the theoretical values (shown later.) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Wave forms obtained at various check points of complex code generator 
 
As shown in Figure 3, prior to application of clock pulse, the value of output codes from 
PN(7) to PN(0) is ‘11111111’. With the arrival of positive-going edge of first clock pulse the output 
changes to ‘01111111’. The arrival of subsequent clock pulses then keeps on changing the output to 
‘00111111’, ‘10011111’, ‘01001111’, ‘00100111’, ‘000100111’, ‘000010011’, ‘10000100’ and so on 
in that sequence, which is in complete agreement with the theoretical results. The complex codes 
obtained from the complex code generator as shown in Figure 3 are used to scramble incoming data 
stream at the transmitter, as shown in Figure 4. At the receiving end, the  same codes are generated 
for successful decryption of data.  
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Figure 4.  Wave forms obtained at various check points of data scrambler and descrambler 
 
   The simulation results are shown in Figure 4.  ‘Clk’ represents the input signal clock used to 
drive the system, ‘Ptext’ is the input plain text at the transmitting end, and ‘Rtext’ represents the 
received data after decryption at the receiver. ‘Scram’ represents the scrambled signal corresponding 
to the input data.  As shown in the figure, transmitted data and the received version of it are in 
complete agreement. However, the wave forms of the transmitted data and its scrambled version do 
not resemble at all. 
  The RTL viewers of the implemented designs, viz. scrambler and descrambler, are shown in 
Figures  5  and  6  respectively.    Figure  7  shows  RTL  viewer  of  the  implemented  complex  code 
generator. Finally, a comparison of the codes generated by the proposed scheme with those generated 
conventionally [3] is presented in Table 1. The comparison is depicted graphically in Figure 8.  It is 
clear that the codes generated using the same length of LFSR are much more complex (more lengthy) 
than those generated using the conventional PN code generator.            
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Figure  5.  RTL viewer of complex-code-based data scrambler 
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Figure  6.  RTL viewer of complex-code-based data descrambler 
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Figure 7.  RTL viewer of complex code generator 
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  Table 1.  Resource utilisation summary 
    
 
 
 
                         
Figure 8.  Code length comparison 
 
Conclusions 
A new modified scheme for complex PN-code-based data scrambler and descrambler has been 
presented. The proposed scheme uses a complex code generator, capable of generating lengthy codes 
using a LFSR with relatively less number of stages, for data encryption and decryption. The proposed 
scheme has been modelled in VHDL synthesised and simulated for target device EP2S15F484C3 of 
Straitx  II  FPGA  family  using  Quarts  Altera  version  8.1  However,  for  defense  and  aerospace 
applications where design certainly carries special technical challenges, the choice for the target device   
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can be Xilinx Virtex-5Q family of FPGAs. This provides 65-nm, high-density and high- performance 
FPGA technology suitable for secure communication systems. The proposed scheme is capable of 
providing a range of applications in Spread Spectrum Modulation, Code Division Multiple Access and 
Global Positioning Systems. The scheme can be synthesised and implemented on any of the existing 
CPLD and FPGA systems as per the degree of optimisation required.  
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